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  ABSTRACT 
______________________________________________________________________ 
The quantitative macroeconomics literature has documented that in the basic 
Overlapping Generations model a privatization of the social security system, going from 
a Pay-As-You-Go to a Fully Funded system, generates large long run welfare gains at 
the cost of substantial welfare losses for initial generations. We propose an alternative 
to previous literature. In this paper we maximize over the entire policy space, following 
the optimal fiscal policy approach, rather than comparing alternative policy paths one to 
one. That is, policies are chosen as part of the optimal design of a social security 
privatization in a Pareto improving way. The government decides endogenously how to 
finance the implicit social security liabilities and compensate the initial generations 
alive during the transition. In contrast with previous analysis the resulting allocation, by 
construction, lies on the constrained Pareto frontier. We find that the optimal design of 
reforms exhibits sizeable welfare gains, arising because of the reduction in labor supply 
distortions. In contrast, the welfare gains coming from the reduction of savings 
distortions are relatively small.
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Efficiency considerations have often been used as arguments for reforming public 
Social Security systems, usually of a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) nature, in favor of Fully 
Funded systems (FF). As a consequence, research on the quantitative evaluation of 
social security reforms to assess their efficiency gains has been one of the main topics in 
this area.
1 The standard large scale Overlapping Generations (OG) model predicts very 
large efficiency and welfare gains in the long run from funding social security. 
Nevertheless, in most studies the consideration of the transitional dynamics has lead 
researchers to conclude that, despite the potential large welfare gains, the privatization 
of the social security system involves substantial welfare losses along the transition. In 
this paper we propose an alternative approach: the use of optimal fiscal policy tools in 
order to maximize over the policy space instead of comparing parametric reforms one to 
one. By using such a strategy we identify constrained Pareto efficient policies that allow 
financing the transition from a PAYG to a FF system in a Pareto improving way. In 
addition, the approach allows going beyond social security reform (or privatization) and 
explore the welfare gains that come from the relaxation of the constraints on tax 
instruments in a broader tax reform. 
Building on the seminal work of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), there are several 
papers that study the transition associated to a social security privatization and find 
substantial efficiency and welfare gains in the long run.
2 In particular Huang, 
Imrohoroglu and Sargent (1997) show that a complete or partial privatization implies 
large short-run welfare losses, which cannot be compensated with the long-run gains. 
Conesa and Krueger (1999) show that in the presence of uninsurable labor income 
uncertainty the welfare losses of the initial cohorts are even larger, because the 
unfunded social security system provides partial insurance. Kotlikoff, Smetters and 
Walliser (1999) analyze different types of transitions and find that transition generations 
experience a 1 to 3 percent welfare decline, while future generations experience gains 
that are close to 20 percent. Using a different approach, Feldstein and Samwick (1998) 
find smaller but still positive transition costs. Conesa and Garriga (2003) show that 
eliminating compulsory retirement rules with the privatization can substantially reduce 
                                                 
1 Feldstein and Liebman (2002) summarize the discussion on transition to investment-based systems, 
analyzing the welfare effects and the risks associated to such systems. 
2 Theoretical frameworks that introduce dynastic considerations within the life-cycle framework, such as 
some sort of intergenerational links as in Fuster (1999) or Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2004), 
might imply that the efficiency gains are much more moderate or even inexistent. 
  2the welfare losses of the initial generations alive, but yet these are still substantial. 
Finally, Prescott (2005) and Joines (2005) identify a policy path such that no cohorts are 
worse off. In general all these alternative plans for social security reforms have been 
proposed and compared one to one. However, it is possible to do better, in particular, 
tax plans that come from a well-defined welfare maximization problem. This represents 
our main contribution to the existing literature on the macroeconomic and welfare 
implications of social security reforms. We provide an environment in which the 
reforms are endogenously chosen by the fiscal authority given status quo constraints. In 
doing so we go beyond identifying a particular policy that would do the job, and we 
identify policies lying on the constrained (by the use of distortionary taxation) Pareto 
frontier.
3
Notice that if there were no distortions and the economy was dynamically efficient it is 
not feasible to redistribute resources across generations in a Pareto improving way. This 
classic result goes back to Diamond (1965) and Gale (1973), who studied the “Classical 
case” as compared to the “Samuelson case” of dynamic inefficiency. A social security 
system is an intergenerational redistribution device, and hence changing the system 
itself cannot generate welfare gains. Alternatively, if the financing of social security is 
distortionary, Homburg (1990) and Rangel (1997) use a two period overlapping 
generations model to show that Pareto improvements are possible by reducing labor 
supply distortions. In a similar spirit Feldstein (1995, 1998) shows that two conditions 
are required in order to increase the present value of consumption of all generations. 
First, the return on capital must exceed the implicit return in the unfunded system. 
Second, the marginal product of capital exceeds the social discount rate. Our benchmark 
economy will satisfy both conditions by construction. Necessarily, the presence of 
distortions in our environment is what allows us to design Pareto improving reforms, 
and thus the Ramsey approach as pioneered by Escolano (1992), Erosa and Gervais 
(2002) and Garriga (1999) seems the natural approach. 
The relevant aspect in our exercise is how to generate and redistribute the surplus 
generated by the minimization of distortions in order to engineer a Pareto improving 
social security reform. Alternatively, one could take the social security as an 
institutional constraint on the policy maker and then the same approach could be used to 
                                                 
3 By assumption lump-sum taxes are not allowed, as usual in the Ramsey approach to optimal fiscal 
policy. In contrast to the Ramsey approach, Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) pioneered an 
alternative approach to dynamic optimal fiscal policy based on the existence of informational 
asymmetries. In their analysis the set of tax instruments is endogenously determined by the information 
set available to the fiscal authority. 
  3determine the optimal financing of such a system.
4
We abstract from a large and growing literature on positive theories of social security, 
starting with Samuelson (1975) focusing on dynamic inefficiency, Feldstein (1985) and 
Diamond (2004) pointing at myopic behavior, Cooley and Soares (1999), Boldrin and 
Rustichini (2000), Forni (2005) stressing the political economy aspects, Krueger and 
Kubler (2006) focusing on intergenerational risk-sharing or Boldrin and Montes (2004) 
focusing on intergenerational contracts. 
In our benchmark economy there is survival uncertainty and we assume away annuity 
markets, so that the only efficiency role of a social security system is to partially 
substitute for this missing market. 
Demographic considerations also play an important role in the social security debate. 
However, in order to focus on efficiency considerations we abstract from demographic 
changes. For example, see De Nardi, Imrohoroglu and Sargent (1999) and Jeske (2003) 
for a quantitative evaluation of the impact of demographic projections on the U.S. social 
security imbalances. 
The quantitative analysis of optimal fiscal policy in OG economies was pioneered by 
Escolano (1992), whereas the theoretical properties have been recently considered by 
Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Garriga (1999). Following these papers, we will show the 
importance of different sets of tax instruments for generating the results. Notice that 
whenever we allow for age-specific capital income taxes this will allow the fiscal 
authority to implement annuities. Our contribution relative to these papers is not how to 
define optimal fiscal policy in an OG framework, but rather how to use this framework 
to identify the relevant margins that allow for Pareto improving social security reforms 
(something that has proved very hard so far in the social security reform quantitative 
literature). 
We will first analyze a benchmark case where only compensatory transfers to the initial 
old, government debt and time varying labor income taxes are allowed. Later we will 
investigate how policy recommendations and welfare would change if we consider tax 
reforms that allow for a larger set of instruments (capital income taxes and age-
dependence of taxes). 
Our main conclusions are the following: 
1. There exists a Pareto neutral reform, making explicit the implicit debt of social 
security and leaving all distortions unchanged, but it is possible to do better than that by 
                                                 
4 Conesa and Garriga (2007) follows this alternative scenario and solves for the optimal financing of the 
existing level of pensions when the economy faces an adverse transitory demographic shock. 
  4reducing distortions. 
2. Optimal social security reforms consist of providing compensatory transfers to the 
initial old (almost as large as their social security entitlements) financed with debt and 
lowering labor income taxes on impact in order to increase them later on. 
3. The relaxation of the constraints on tax instruments shifts the distribution of welfare 
gains between present and future cohorts. The ability to discriminate labor income taxes 
across cohorts substantially reduces the need to resort to compensatory transfers to the 
initial old generations. 
4. Introducing capital income taxes in the analysis generates some additional welfare 
gains, but it usually implies very large non-smooth changes in capital income taxes that 
call into question its relevance as actual policy options. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic 
environment under the Status Quo policies. Section 3 describes how to view PAYG 
social security as an implicit debt and the neutrality of making explicit this debt. Section 
4 discusses how the benchmark economy is parameterized. Section 5 shows how to 
specify the government problem. Section 6 discusses the results in our benchmark 
scenario: the government can only use compensatory transfers to the initial old, age-
independent labor income taxes, and debt. Section 7 discusses how the conclusions 
change if we relax the constraints imposed on the set of tax instruments. Section 8 
concludes. All the references are in Section 9. 
 
 
2. The Status Quo Economic Environment 
 
Households 
The economy is populated by a measure of households who live for a maximum of I 
periods and grows at rate  . We denote by  n i ϕ  the conditional survival probability, i.e. 
Prob(alive at age  1 | alive at age  ) i ii ϕ =+ . Therefore, let  11 2 1, ... ii ss 1 ϕ ϕϕ − = =⋅⋅ ⋅  be 
the unconditional probability of being alive at age i. 
i μWe will denote  i μ  the measure of 
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  5Preferences of a household born in period t depend on the stream of consumption and 
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Each household owns one unit of time in each period that they can allocate for work or 
leisure. One unit of time devoted to work by a household of age i
i translates into  i ε
i ε 
efficiency units of labor in the market. These households compulsory retire in period  .  r i
Finally, since there is survival uncertainty and we assume away annuity markets, we 
will assume that the government collects the assets of the deceased. This assumption is 
done for the following reasons. First, notice that the taxation of transfers such as 
unintended bequests is non-distortionary, so a benevolent government would choose to 
tax them away. Also, our assumption guarantees that the Ramsey planner will not have 
access to additional non-distortionary sources of taxation (taxing away accidental 
bequests) not present in the benchmark economy. 
 
Technology 
The production possibility frontier is given by an aggregate production function 
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aggregate labor measured in efficiency units. Aggregate labor efficiency,  , grows at 
an exogenous rate of technological progress 
t A
x. We assume the function   displays 
constant returns to scale, is monotonically increasing, strictly concave and satisfies the 
Inada conditions. The capital stock depreciates at a constant rate 
F
δ . 
The resource constraint is given by: 
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where consumption, capital and government expenditure are deflated by the growth rate 
of output in a balanced growth path (1 )(1 ) x n + + . 
 
Government 
The government influences this economy through the social security and the general 
budget. For simplicity we assume that in the benchmark economy these two programs 
operate with different budgets. Then, pensions ( t p
t tr) are financed through a payroll tax 
  6(
p
t τ ) and the social security budget is balanced. On the other hand, the government 
collects consumption taxes (
c
t τ ), labor income taxes (
l
t τ ), capital income taxes (
k
t τ ) 
and issues public debt ( t b
t b) in order to finance an exogenously given stream of 
government consumption ( t g ). 
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Notice that all variables are deflated by the growth rate (1 )(1 ) x n + + . 
 
Market arrangements 
We assume there is a single representative firm that operates the aggregate technology 
taking factor prices as given. Households sell an endogenously chosen fraction of their 
time as labor ( ) in exchange for a competitive wage of   per efficiency unit of labor. 
They rent their assets ( ) to firms or the government in exchange for a competitive 
price ( ), and decide how much to consume and save out of their disposable income. 
The sequential budget constraint for a working age household is given by: 
, it l t w
, it a
t r
                (4)  ,1 , 1 , (1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 (1 ) )
cl p






It is important to note that in the way the environment is written consumers do not see 
any connection between their social security contributions while working and their 
 
Upon retirement households do not work and receive a public pension in a lump-sum 
fashion. Their budget constraint is: 
                              (5)  ,1 , 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 (1 ) )
cl
ti t i t tt tti cx a p r ττ ++ + ++ =− ++−
 
The alternative interpretation of a mandatory retirement rule is to consider different 
labor income tax rates for individuals of ages above and below  . In particular, a 
confiscatory tax on labor income beyond age   is equivalent to compulsory retirement. 
Both formulations yield the same results. However, when we study the optimal policy 
we prefer this alternative interpretation since it considers compulsory retirement as just 
one more distortionary tax that the fiscal authority can optimize over. 
r i
r i
  7future social security pensions. If consumers would establish such a link and hours 
worked would be chosen taking into account its effect on future pensions, then the 
distortionary impact of social security would be smaller. See Feldstein and Liebman 
(2002) for a discussion of this issue. 
Finally notice we assumed away annuity markets, so that social security plays a role as 
partial insurance. 
 
Definition 1: A market equilibrium in the status quo economy is a sequence of prices 
nd allocations such that: i) consumers maximize utility subject to their corresponding 
Social Security as Implicit Debt and Pareto 
 system is an intergenerational redistribution scheme, or 
quivalently an implicit debt scheme. The young provide resources through 
y is 
a
budget constraints given the equilibrium prices, ii) firms maximize profits given prices, 






An unfunded social security
e
contributions that are used to finance the benefits of the retired. Contributions made by 
the young generate an entitlement to a future benefit upon retirement, which constitutes 
an implicit debt of the social security administration towards them. Upon retirement, 
these new retirees sell their claims to social security to the new cohorts of workers. 
Consequently, a social security privatization only amounts to making explicit the 
implicit debt. Diamond (1965) and Gale (1973) showed that if the econom
dynamically efficient and the labor supply is perfectly inelastic, then it is not possible to 
redistribute resources across generations in a Pareto improving way. As a result, in their 
framework, a PAYG social security system cannot be transformed into a fully funded 
system in a way that makes every cohort better off. Next, we show that this result can be 
extended to a more general setup. The idea is very simple, it amounts to show that an 
equilibrium for an economy with an unfunded social security system is equivalent to an 
equilibrium of an economy with funded social security where the implicit debt is made 
explicit. 
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Proof: First, since we leave all tax rates (including social security contributions
5) and 
it i t
prices as in the benchmark economy, clearly the Euler and Labor Supply conditions of 
the consumer’s problem are satisfied for the same allocation: 
  ˆ (1 ) 1 (1 )
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ext, we construct a new sequence of assets in the following way:  N
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Here notice that the process has to be done backwards with respect to time, but this is 
 sequence of assets has been constructed such that the retirement pensions are 
l 
capital stock we obtain a different level of government debt, 
ai




6 Notice then that  1,t a %  is not zero, in fact it will be equal to the net present 
value of future pensions received under the PAYG regime since the intertemporal 
budget constraint has to be the same in order to support the same consumer allocation. 
This could be decentralized in the form of a lump-sum tax cut for the youngest cohort. 
If we sum this new asset distribution across cohorts and time, and subtract the origina
ˆ
tt B B > % . The difference 
                                                 
5 Notice that now the distinction between labor income taxes (going to the general budget) and payroll 
taxes (to finance pensions) is meaningless, since there are no pensions to finance anymore. 
6 Figure 2 will display the original asset distribution (labeled in the figure as “With PAYG”) and the new 
one constructed in the way we just explained (labeled in the figure as “Implicit Assets”), for our 
parameterized economy. 
  9between this new level of debt and the original one is the implicit debt of the social 
security system. The implicit debt of the social security system is a constant fraction of 
output along a balanced growth path, but might change along transitional dynamics 
since prices and pensions change over time. 
Since the allocation is the same as in the original equilibrium feasibility is satisfied. 
Walras’ Law guarantees that the Government Budget Constraint holds. Finally, notice 
tforward to 
ngineer a Pareto neutral social security privatization. First, notice that the way the 
cial security payments at birth (the level of assets corresponding to 
G regime. Moreover, since the 
nts are only possible if and only if 
 perform such an exercise in a parameterized version of 
that since the aggregates have not changed, the equilibrium prices for the economy with 
the funded system and for the original economy with an unfunded system are the same. 
Hence, we do have a competitive equilibrium with funded social security.▄ 
 
An immediate application of the equivalence result is that it would be straigh
e
implicit assets are constructed the only thing we would be doing is giving to all 
currently alive consumers a lump sum transfer equal to the net present value of their 
future social security payments, i.e. their social security entitlements. Then, by 
construction their intertemporal budget constraint is not affected and their allocations 
would not change. 
Furthermore, if every newborn generation would be given a transfer equal to the net 
present value of so
age 1), the intertemporal budget constraint would not change and therefore it would be 
optimal to choose the same allocation of consumption and leisure, together with a 
sequence of assets equal to the one just constructed. 
Neither the initial old nor any subsequent newborn generation would change behavior 
relative to the original allocation under the PAY
allocation is feasible and the consumers' budget constraints are satisfied, the 
government budget constraint is also satisfied. We have just shown how to change the 
direction of intergenerational transfers without affecting allocations or welfare, thus 
making explicit the implicit debt of social security. 
Since intergenerational redistribution cannot itself generate Pareto improvements in a 
dynamically efficient economy, Pareto improveme
there exist distortions in social security financing or in the general fiscal system. This 
issue has been addressed in Homburg (1990) and Rangel (1997) using a two period 
overlapping generations model. 
In what follows we show how to generate substantial efficiency gains both in the short-
run and in the long-run. We will
  10a standard large-scale OG framework. Then, we will maximize over policies in an 
environment where both transition cohorts and future newborns are better off than in the 
benchmark economy and discuss specific policy recommendations. In addition, we 
explore the welfare impact of allowing for a larger set of fiscal instruments so we can 
measure the quantitative importance of minimizing distortions on various margins. 
It is important to note here that in the standard social security reform literature pensions 
and social security contributions are eliminated over time following some arbitrary way, 
. Parameterization of the Status Quo Economy 
ne period in the model is the equivalent of 5 years. Given our choice of period we 
ds live up to a maximum of 14 periods, so that the economically active 
and then the macroeconomic and welfare implications are analyzed. Effectively, most of 
this type of exercises implied some partial or complete default on promises (equivalent 
to a default on the implicit debt of social security), which was at the root of the large 
welfare losses of transition cohorts. In our exercise this is ruled out, since we maximize 








life of a household starts at age 20 and we assume that households live at most to age 
89. In the benchmark economy households retire in period 10 (equivalent to age 65 in 
years). 
Survival probabilities, () i ϕ , are taken from Bell and Miller (2002), with the assumption 
that households die with probability 1 when reaching age 90. 
Finally, we assume that the mass of newborn households (and hence the total mass of 
households) grows at an annual rate  1.1% n = . 
 
Endowments 
The only endowment households have is their efficiency units of labor at each period. 
These are taken from the Hansen (1993) estimates, conveniently extrapolated to the 
entire lifetime of households.
7
 
                                                 
7 In order to avoid sample selection biases we assume that the rate of decrease of efficiency units of labor 
after age 65 is the same as in the previous period. 
  11Figure 1: Age-Profile of Efficiency Units of Labor from Hansen (1993) 















We assume that in the benchmark economy the government runs two completely 
independent budgets. One is the social security budget that operates on a balanced 
budget. The payroll tax is taken from the data and is equal to 10.5%, which is the Old-
Age and Survival Insurance, OASI (excluding Medicare and Disability Insurance). Ou  
out demographics (implying a ratio of population over 65 to working age 




of 24%) together with the balanced budget condition directly determine the amount of 
the public retirement pension. It will be 43% of the average gross labor income (51% 
relative to labor income net of taxes). 
The level of government consumption is exogenously given. It is financed through a 
consumption tax, set equal to 5%, a marginal tax on capital income equal to 33% and a 
marginal tax on labor income net of social security contributions equal to 16%. We use 
the methodology proposed by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) to estimate these 
effective tax rates. The effective disto
by 
pc (1- )(1- )/(1+ )=1-0.3
l ττ τ , yielding an effective tax of 30%. 
The government issues public debt in order to satisfy its sequential budget constraint. 
  12Calibration: Functional Forms 
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where 0 β >  represents the discount rate,  (0,1) γ ∈  denotes the share of consumption on 
e uti ction, and th lity fun   0 σ >  governs the concavity of the utility function. The implied 
tion ption is equal to   in consum 1/(1-(1- ) ) σ γ . 
e standard Cobb-Douglas form: 
intertemporal elasticity of substitu
Technology has constant returns to scale and takes th
()
1
tt t t YKA L
α α − =  where α  represents the capital incom
We define aggregate capital to be the level of Fixed Assets in the BEA statistics. 
the ratio of outst fe
at ly Depreciation is also taken from the BEA 
atistics, it is a fraction of 12% of GDP. Another calibration target is an average of 1/3 
ed to market activities. We will choose a curvature 
e share. We assume that labor 
efficiency,  t, grows at  1.75% x =  a year. 
 
Calibration: Empirical Targets 
A
Therefore, our calibration target will be a ratio K/Y=3 in yearly terms. Also, computing 
anding ( deral, state and local) government debt to GDP we get the 
following r io B/Y=0.5 in year  terms. 
st
of the time of households allocat
parameter in the utility function consistent with a consumption intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution of 0.5 (around empirical values obtained in the literature). Government 
consumption is fixed to 18.6% of output, as observed in the data. Finally, the capital 
income share is measured from the national accounts. 
 
Calibration Results 
In order to calibrate our economy we proceed as follows. First, we fix the curvature 
parameter in the utility function to be  4 σ =  and the capital share in the production 
function  0.34 α = . Then the discount factor  1.0375 β =  is chosen to match a wealth to 
output ratio of 3.5, and the consumption share  0.31 γ =  is chosen in order to match an 
verage of 1/3 of time devoted to working in the market economy. The depreciation rate 
uilibrium depreciation is 12% of output, as in the data. 
a
is chosen so that in eq
Notice that  4 σ =  and  0.31 γ =  together imply a consumption intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution of 0.5 (CRRA of 2). 
  13Table 1 summarizes the parameters chosen and the empirical targets that are more 
related to them. 
Table 1: Calibration Targets and Parameter Values 
Empi argets  rical T A/Y  IES Av.Hours wN/Y Dep./Y 
Empirical Values  3.5  0.5  1/3  0.66  0.12 
Parameters  β   σ   γ   α   δ  
Calibrated Values  1.0375 4  0.31  0.34  0.0436 
 
Using the em d of e s n , we derive 
from the gov nst  an lied  ibriu er  debt of 50% 
of output. This figure is consistent with the average figure in the data. herefore, the 
capital/outpu
iven this parameterization, social security payments in the benchmark economy 
nomy just described. We construct it following exactly the 
ation is the sequence 
nd substract the Steady State capital stock we find a new level of debt, 
pirical tax rates an  ratio   gov rnment con umptio  to GDP
ernment budget co raint  imp equil m gov nment
 T
t ratio is 3 as desired. 
G
amount to 6.9% of GDP. 
 
Social Security as Implicit Debt: a Quantitative Measurement 
Given the model parameterization, we first calculate the implicit debt of the social 
security system. 
Consider an alternative decentralization for the same Steady State allocation associated 
to the parameterized eco




= % , labeled as “Implicit Assets” in Figure 2. Notice that if we integrate this new 
asset allocation a
B % . The difference between this new level of debt and the original one is the implicit 
debt of social security (the sum of the net present value of future pensions of all 
cohorts), which in our parameterization is 2.2 times GDP. 
 that here the assumption of complete markets might be important. If a particular 
age cohort is borrowing constrained, then a change of the direction of intergenerational 
distribution could alleviate its constraint, changing its behavior and therefore prices 
would change. Hence, in order to satisfy the equivalence of allocations the lump sum 
payment should be made in a period where the individual is
Notice
re
 not borrowing constrained. 
 
  14Figure 2: Implicit Assets of the PAYG Social Security System 
















5. Specifying the Ramsey Problem 
YG social 
 by any of the agents in the 
conomy. The expected utility for each generation associated to remaining in an 
 
We assume that in period  1 t =  the economy is in a steady state with a PA
security system, and no reform has been anticipated
e
economy with the existing PAYG social security system is given by: 











=− ∑                                                   (10) 
where  ˆ ˆ , cl ii
ˆ ˆ, ii cl are steady state allocations of generation  j . 
At the beginning of period 2, the government impl
and gives a one-period lump-sum transfer to all the initial generations alive who have 
n of optimally chosen transfers is 
ements a FF social security system 
contributed to the old PAYG system. The total amou t 
financed issuing new debt. To maximize the size of the welfare gains we let the 
government choose the level of debt issued and the optimal tax mix to finance the newly 
issued debt and the pre-existing level of government expenditure. 
  15The government objective function is a utilitarian welfare function of all future newborn 
individuals, where the relative weight that the government places between present and 
future generations is captured by the geometric discount factor  (0,1) λ∈ . Formally,  
eriod 
We use the primal approach to optimal taxatio
(1980). This approach is based on characterizing the set of allocations that the 
ent ca he optimal tax 
he economy finding the prices and the tax 
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where ( , )
tt Ucl  represents lifetime utility of generation born in p   t.
n as discussed in Atkinson and Stiglitz 
governm n implement for a given policy. The government chooses t
burden taking into account the decision rules of all individuals in the economy, and the 
effect of their decisions on market prices.  
Therefore, the government problem amounts to maximizing its objective function over 
the set of implementable allocations together with the status quo constraints.
8 From the 
optimal allocations we can decentralize t
policy associated to the social security reform. The derivation of the set of 
implementable allocations is very similar to the formulations derived by Erosa and 
Gervais (2002) and Garriga (1999). Since there are some differences because of the 
presence of survival uncertainty, we show how to derive them in the Appendix. It is 
worth pointing out that the implementability constraints do not depend on the 
availability or not of annuity markets, since annuities are equivalent to age-dependent 
capital income taxes (making the return on savings contingent on age). Nevertheless, 
the absence or not of annuities will matter when we impose the constraint of age-
independence of capital income taxes on the Ramsey problem. 
Conditional on our choice of weights placed on different generations
9, the set of 
constrained efficient allocations can be obtained through the following maximization 
problem: 
 
8 Throughout the paper we assume that the government can commit to its policies ignoring time 
consistency issues. Clearly, this is an important restriction that affects the results. The analysis of a time 
consistent reform goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
9 We are just identifying one Pareto efficient reform, but it is clearly not unique. Placing different weights 
on generations or the initial old would generate a different distribution of welfare gains across agents. 
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  222 Given , ,
kc K τ τ  
 
where the choice variables are all the allocations and potentially a compensatory 
transfer   to each of the initial generations alive j, at the initial period of the 
reform. 
,2 0 j t ≥
Constraint (12) is the standard resource constraint. Constraint (13) is the 
implementability constraint for each generation born after the reform is announced and 
implemented. Constraint (14) represents the implementability constraints for those 
generations alive at the beginning of the reform, where  2
k τ
2
k τ and  2
c τ  are the benchmark 
taxes on capital income and consumption which are taken as given, and  ,2 j a  are the 
initial asset holdings of generation  j . Notice that taking  2
k τ  and  2
c τ  as given is not an 
innocuous assumption, since that way we avoid confiscatory taxation of the initial 
wealth. Finally, constraints (15) and (16) guarantee that the policy chosen makes 
everybody better off than continuing with the status quo policy, guaranteeing a Pareto 
improving reform. In particular, given that the government objective function does not 
include the initial generations Equation (15) will always be binding. 
Notice that this formulation imposes some restrictions, since the initial generations alive 
at the beginning of the reform are not part of the objective function, and only appear as 
a policy constraint. An equivalent formulation would include the initial s generations in 
the objective function with a specific weight  s λ , where the weight is chosen to 
guarantee that the status quo conditions for each generation are satisfied. 
  17The policy maker discounts the future at the exponential rate  [, 1 ) λ λ ∈ . The Pareto 
improving nature of the reform implies that the rate λ  has to be big enough to satisfy 
the participation constraints of all future generations. In particular, if λ  were too low 
then the long run capital stock would be too low and then constraint (16) would be 
violated in the long run. That restricts the range of admissible values for λ  to values 
where the steady state solution of the government problem for a newborn yields higher 
utility than in the benchmark economy. 
Of course, within a certain range there is some discretionality in the choice of this 
parameter, implying a different allocation of welfare gains across future generations. 
We investigate different values for that arbitrary choice. 
 
Further Constraints on the Ramsey Problem 
The main objective of the paper is to identify Pareto improving social security reforms, 
even though indirectly our exercise also identifies more general Pareto improving tax 
reforms. When reforming the social security system, relative to our benchmark 
economy, we want to restrict the government to use the same set of tax instruments. 
Clearly, moving to a more efficient tax system generates welfare gains, but then it is not 
clear how much of the welfare gains come from the relaxation of the constraints on the 
tax instruments. 
Notice that the way the Ramsey problem is specified above the fiscal authority has 
access to age specific taxes.
10 This implies that we provide the fiscal authority with 
more instruments than in the benchmark economy. In order to prevent that possibility 
we will introduce additional constraints on the set of instruments. The way to introduce 
them is to reformulate these constraints in terms of allocations and then impose them as 
additional constraints on the Ramsey problem. 
In particular we will use three types of constraints: age independent labor income taxes, 
age independent capital income taxes, and finally, a regime where capital income taxes 
are left unchanged relative to the benchmark. 
Constraining taxes to be independent of age implies imposing that the appropriate 
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10 Annuities imply that the return on savings must be adjusted for the survival probability. Effectively, 
then, annuities impose age-specific return on savings. Notice then that annuities are equivalent to the 
existence of age-specific capital income taxes. 
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where constraint (17) imposes that labor income taxes are equal for all cohorts working 
in period  . Constraint (18) implies that all households pay the same capital income tax 
and there are no annuity markets. We do so since annuity markets are equivalent to age 
dependent capital income taxes, and it seems hard to assume that the planner can 
implement annuities while not being able to discriminate capital income taxes across 
households. 
t
Finally, if we want capital income taxes to be left unchanged we impose: 
1, 2, 1,
2 ,1 3 ,1 ,1
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Notice here that whenever we impose equal capital taxes across cohorts we are 
imposing the first order condition for savings under the assumption of absence of 
annuities. 
Next, Section 6 describes the results for a benchmark case where only labor income 
taxes equal across cohorts are allowed, i.e. we compute the Ramsey problem including 
constraints (17) and (19). We take this case as our benchmark since social security 
financing is associated to labor income taxes. This way we decompose the welfare gains 
that come directly from the elimination of the distortions most associated to the 
financing of PAYG systems (i.e. payroll taxes), as compared to the gains coming from 
the rationalization of other distortions (i.e. age-dependent taxes or capital income taxes). 
Also, the comparison to the standard literature is more direct, since usually it is only 
labor income taxes that are changed over the transitions. Later, Section 7 will compare 
these results with an environment in which the constraints are relaxed. 
 
 
6. Social Security reforms 
 
We focus directly on the design of a Pareto improving transition in an environment 
where the government is restricted to use a common labor income tax, debt, and one 
period lump-sum transfers to the initial cohorts as the only fiscal instruments. Hence 
consumption and capital income taxes are left as in the benchmark economy. Notice 
that the compensatory transfers could be given to all the initial cohorts and we put no 
  19constraint on their size (except for non-negativity to prevent lump-sum taxation). Since 
these transfers will have to be paid for with current or future taxes, the fiscal authority 
will have incentives to use them as little as possible.  
Since our main interest is in designing reforms we will focus our attention on the 
evolution of the policy variables over the transition. In the Appendix we report the 
evolution of real allocations over time. 
We report the evolution of policies over time for three different values of the discount 
factor in the Ramsey problem: 0.96, 0.97 and 0.98. Values smaller than 0.96 generate 
less capital accumulation than in the benchmark economy and cannot guarantee that 
welfare in the final steady state is larger than in the benchmark economy. 
In displaying the results we will arbitrarily label the year 2005 to be the Steady State of 
the benchmark economy and the reform is announced and implemented the following 
period, i.e. at the beginning of 2010. Remember that a period in the model is 5 years. 
The optimally chosen level of transfers to the initial cohorts is reported in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Transfers to initial generations (% 
of entitlements) 
Generation  λ =0.96  λ =0.97  λ =0.98 
20-24 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
25-29 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
30-34 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
35-39 0.0000  0.0000  0.6005 
40-44 0.3365  0.5474  0.8638 
45-49 0.6821  0.8030  0.9735 
50-54 0.8575  0.9239  1.0132 
55-59 0.9413  0.9748  1.0181 
60-64 0.9717  0.9860  1.0029 
65-69 0.9676  0.9721  0.9769 
70-74 0.9986  0.9979  0.9963 
75-79 1.0083  1.0048  1.0006 
80-84 0.9961  0.9919  0.9877 
85-89 0.9745  0.9698  0.9651 
TOTAL 0.8926  0.9166  0.9639 
 
  20Notice that the government chooses to give large compensatory transfers. In total, these 
transfers amount to a large fraction of total entitlements (89% if  0.96 λ = , 92% if 
0.97 λ =  and 96% if  0.98 λ = ). The reason is that only changing the future path of 
labor income taxes it is very difficult to compensate households from the loss of social 
security pensions, and hence most of the initial generations need to be transferred 
almost all of their entitlements. In the next section, we will see that this will radically 
change when the fiscal authority has access to a larger set of policies, in particular age-
dependent labor income taxes. 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of labor income taxes for different λ  

















Figure 3 describes the evolution of the optimal labor income tax along the reform. We 
decentralize the resulting allocation leaving consumption taxes unchanged, even though 
it is possible to decentralize the same allocation in alternative ways. In particular, we 
could set consumption taxes to zero and increase labor income taxes so that they are 
consistent with the optimal wedge chosen by the fiscal authority. 
Labor income taxes are substantially lowered the first period following the reform, but 
then they are increased at different points in time depending on the value of the discount 
factor. As expected, the more patient the Ramsey planner is, the higher taxes for the 
transition generations and the lower taxes for the final generations. 
  21The reason why taxes follow such a non-smooth path is that the planner targets different 
cohorts with only one fiscal instrument. The path of labor income taxes needs to satisfy 
two objectives: guaranteeing the initial generations the same welfare as in the 
benchmark economy, and generating welfare gains for subsequent newborns. 
Since the fiscal authority has to pay a very large amount of compensatory transfers, debt 
experiences a very large increase on impact. Figure 4 displays the evolution of the debt 
to GDP ratio for different values of the discount factor. 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of Debt/GDP ratio for different λ  












Overall, such a reform generates substantial welfare gains for newborn generations, 
while leaving cohorts initially alive indifferent by construction. The welfare gains 
accruing to newborns are plotted in Figure 5.  
Notice here very clearly the role of the discount factor in the Ramsey problem. A larger 
discount factor implies that welfare gains are shifted from early newborns to later 
newborns. All these welfare numbers are measured in equivalent variation in 
consumption, so that a value of 1.055 implies that the new generation born in 2010 will 
experience a welfare increase relative to a newborn in the benchmark economy 
equivalent to a 5.5% increase in consumption in all periods of their life. 
 
  22Figure 5: Evolution of welfare of the newborns for different λ  














The welfare gains associated to the reform just discussed are substantial. Measured as 
equivalent variation in consumption the welfare gains are equivalent to future newborns 
enjoying between 3 and 8% more consumption than the newborns in the status quo 
economy with a PAYG social security system. 
Such welfare values are lower than most of the welfare gains that the literature has 
found by comparing steady states with and without a PAYG social security system. The 
reason is that in our exercise the need to compensate the initial old increases 
permanently the stock of government debt, so that long run welfare gains are smaller. 
 
 
7. Enlarging the set of fiscal instruments: fiscal 
reforms 
 
We just demonstrated how to engineer social security reforms that make everybody 
better off and lie on the constrained Pareto frontier, keeping the set of fiscal instruments 
exactly the same as in the benchmark economy and only changing its use over time. 
  23Now we will report the impact of relaxing the constraint on the sets of fiscal 
instruments. 
In what follows we will report all the alternative experiments for the average discount 
factor we have considered in the previous Section,  0.97 λ = . Smaller or larger values 
would slightly change our conclusions, as we saw in the previous Section. 
 
Age-dependent labor income taxes 
Now we turn to the case when the fiscal authority could target labor income taxes 
directly to different individuals. This is going to be especially important in the initial 
periods. 
In later periods, why would the government choose to tax discriminate? The basic 
insight is that when individuals exhibit life cycle behavior labor productivity changes 
with age and the response of consumption, labor and savings decisions to tax incentives 
varies with age as well, and that might generate incentives to tax discriminate. Erosa 
and Gervais (2002) or Garriga (1999) explicitly find conditions on preference 
specifications under which the government would choose to tax discriminate. Garriga 
(1999) shows that when households’ preferences are homothetic in consumption and 
labor, then the government does not have an incentive to use tax rates that depend upon 
age, and labor income taxes are uniform for households with an interior solution. 
Table 3 reports the optimal amount of compensatory transfers to the initial old. Notice 
that these are much smaller when the government is allowed to tax discriminate, since 
the government can compensate through taxes instead of transfers. 
 
Table 3: Transfers to initial generations (% of 
entitlements) 
Generation Age-independent Age-dependent 
20-24 0.0000  0.0000 
25-29 0.0000  0.0000 
30-34 0.0000  0.0000 
35-39 0.0000  0.0000 
40-44 0.5474  0.0000 
45-49 0.8030  0.0000 
50-54 0.9239  0.0000 
55-59 0.9748  0.0144 
  2460-64 0.9860  0.4382 
65-69 0.9721  0.6828 
70-74 0.9979  0.7861 
75-79 1.0048  0.8721 
80-84 0.9919  0.9499 
85-89 0.9698  0.9442 
TOTAL 0.9166  0.5187 
 
In particular, with age-dependent labor income taxes only generations after age 55 are 
compensated through transfers, and in total the government transfers amount only to 
52% of the social security entitlements, compared to 92% in the case where taxes have 
to be the same across cohorts. 
On average labor income taxes follow a pattern very similar to the one in the previous 
Section: a large fall on impact and then taxes are increased progressively. The only 
difference is that now the path is smoother, since the planner has access to different 
taxes in order to target different cohorts. 
 
Figure 6: Optimal policy with age dependent labor income taxes 
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Age Dependent Taxes
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How would the government choose to tax discriminate? Figure 6 also reports the shape 
of the labor income tax schedule for different points in time (upper right panel): the first 
two periods of the reform (labeled in the figure as Period 2 and Period 3) and the final 
one (labeled as Final Steady State). 
Clearly the extent to which there is tax discrimination is much larger at the beginning of 
the reform, since the planner wants to use taxes to compensate different cohorts from 
the loss of social security entitlements. There is still tax discrimination in the final 
steady state, but the differences in tax rates across cohorts are much smaller than in the 
initial periods of the reform. 
The policy reported generates an increasing path of government debt, slightly similar to 
the previous one. Also, the value of the social welfare function is higher, since we have 
just removed one constraint from the maximization problem. However, that does not 
mean that welfare is uniformly larger for each single newborn at every period. In fact, 
this alternative policy generates much larger welfare gains for initial newborns, while it 
does generate very few (if any) welfare gains for future newborns. 
Since the government maximizes a weighted discounted sum of utilities and not a 
particular cohort, given our choice of the discount factor, it is preferable to front load 
the welfare gains, provided that the status quo utility constraints are satisfied. In a social 
security reform where tax rates do not depend on age front loading is very costly. 
However, with a larger set of instruments this is relatively easier. 
 
Capital income taxes 
Now we analyze an environment where the government can also use capital income 
taxes, but both labor and capital income taxes are constrained to be equal across 
cohorts. Relative to the benchmark case (only age-independent labor income taxes) the 
need to resort to initial transfers is almost the same, since the government has to pay 
91% of the initial entitlements in transfers (92% in the benchmark economy). The main 
reason is that the capital stock adjusts slowly over time, so the general equilibrium 
impact of lower capital income taxes does not substantially benefit initial cohorts. 
The resulting policy is a very non-smooth path of both policies, as reported in the first 
panel of Figure 7. Overall, this policy improves welfare with respect to the case where 
capital income taxes cannot be used at all (second panel). 
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Figure 7: Optimal policy with age independent labor and capital income taxes 


























The additional welfare gain is equivalent to a further increase in consumption of 2 
percent. This magnitude, and the steady state optimal capital income tax, depends on the 
choice of λ . For our parameterization, the final steady state capital income taxes are 
positive and quite large, with a similar magnitude than the benchmark number. 
It is important to notice that in the final steady state capital income taxes are positive 
and quite large. See Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2007) for a normative analysis of 
capital income taxation and progressivity in a life-cycle model with different sorts of 
heterogeneity and risk. 
 
Age-dependent labor and capital income taxes 
Finally, we turn to the case where no constraints are placed on the Ramsey problem, so 
that the planner can target different cohorts at different points in time with both labor 
and capital income taxes. 
Now the need to resort to compensatory transfers to the initial old is very small, only 
13% of the total entitlements. In particular, the government only needs to give transfers 
to the currently retired, while every other cohort is directly compensated through the 
appropriate choice of tax rates. 
 
Table43: Transfers to initial generations (% of 
entitlements) 
Generation Benchmark  Reform Age-dependent 
20-24 0.0000  0.0000 
25-29 0.0000  0.0000 
  2730-34 0.0000  0.0000 
35-39 0.0000  0.0000 
40-44 0.5474  0.0000 
45-49 0.8030  0.0000 
50-54 0.9239  0.0000 
55-59 0.9748  0.0000 
60-64 0.9860  0.0000 
65-69 0.9721  0.0000 
70-74 0.9979  0.0578 
75-79 1.0048  0.2454 
80-84 0.9919  0.5312 
85-89 0.9698  0.9499 
TOTAL 0.9166 0.1309 
 
The evolution of taxes over time for different cohorts and the welfare implications are 
shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Optimal policy with age dependent labor and capital income taxes 





















































Age-dependent labor and capital taxes
Age-dependent labor taxes
  28Notice that the availability of age-dependent capital income taxes implies the existence 
of very drastic changes in capital income taxes over time. On average capital income 
taxes turn into very large subsidies, especially for the oldest cohorts. This way larger 
welfare gains for the early newborns are possible. It is nevertheless surprising how little 
difference in welfare gains are attained by introducing such a drastic policy. We 
interpret this as evidence that the availability of age-dependent labor income taxes does 
buy a lot in terms of welfare gains. 
Effectively, the ability to discriminate capital income taxes across cohorts becomes a 
very close substitute to compensatory lump-sum transfers to the initial old, and it does 





It is a common prediction of standard OG models that changing the PAYG nature of 
public social security systems towards a FF system might generate substantial efficiency 
and welfare gains in the long run. However, a common feature in the quantitative 
evaluation of social security reform proposals is that these long run efficiency and 
welfare gains come at the cost of substantial welfare losses for transition generations. 
We argue that the optimal fiscal policy approach contributes to this literature by 
maximizing over the entire policy space, rather than comparing exogenously specified 
policies one to one. Following this approach we identify ways to finance the transition 
from PAYG to a FF system that lie on the constrained Pareto frontier. 
We show that a Pareto neutral reform could be implemented by making explicit the 
implicit debt of the social security system. However, we quantitatively show that the 
gains from implementing the optimal fiscal policy, minimizing distortions, are large. 
The optimal social security reform consists of providing compensatory transfers to the 
initial old (almost as large as their social security entitlements) financed with debt and 
lowering labor income taxes on impact in order to increase them later on. 
Investigating the impact of alternative sets of fiscal instruments, we show that the 
ability to discriminate labor income taxes across cohorts substantially reduces the need 
to resort to compensatory transfers to the initial old. It also shifts the welfare gains 
between present and future generations. 
Finally, we show that introducing capital income taxes in the analysis allows to generate 
  29some additional welfare gains, but it usually implies very large non-smooth changes in 
capital income taxes that call into question its relevance as actual policy options. 
The same methodology could be adapted to other issues. In a follow-up paper, see 
Conesa and Garriga (2007), we have used the same methodology to determine the 
optimal financing of existing pensions in an environment where the economy is subject 
to a demographic shock. 
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  33Appendix A: Derivation of the Implementability Constraints 
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The standard procedure is to multiply these conditions by the corresponding choice 
variable, and add up over all periods  1,2,..., iI = . 
So,  
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Notice that if there are annuities only the budget constraint changes: 
() ( ) ( ) 1, 1 1 , 1 1, 1 1 1 , 1( 1 ) 1 1 1
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The existence of annuities implies that the need to save for the desired level of future 
assets is adjusted for survival probabilities. The FOCs would reflect that, but once they 
are substituted back into the budget constraint they generate exactly the same 
implementability condition. Also, it is immediate to see that whether taxes are (or not) 
age dependent does not have any impact on the implementability constraint. 
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The allocations in the following figures correspond to the benchmark case with age-
independent labor income taxes, leaving capital income taxes unchanged. 
We plot these allocations against those corresponding to the benchmark economy with a 
PAYG social security system. 
Figure A.1: The Evolution of Hours Worked

















Notice that even though households are allowed to allocate hours to work beyond age 
65, the planner sets taxes optimally so that they work very little (or zero). 
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Figure A.2: The Evolution of Consumption



















Figure A.3: The Evolution of the Capital Stock
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